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## Politics & People

# Studying A New CIA

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WASHINGTON

President Kennedy's choice to take over command of the limping Central Intelligence Agency put off acceptance until he could make sure of exactly what he would be getting into. The trait thus revealed seems to have been badly needed at the CIA when it was moving into its painful misadventure of last spring.

What the next director upon the retirement of Allen W. Dulles will be getting into will be an agency reorganized to relieve it of a misplaced function, the assessment of information it gathers to determine what that information means. In the case of the Cuban fiasco the agency's information reported deep popular unrest, and the agency appraised this as meaning that a rising would accompany the landing of the exile army. There was no uprising and no won.

### Arm For Disaster

As an activist as well as an assembler of intelligence, the agency then proceeded to arm, train and dispatch the tiny army of liberators on a disaster course. In the process it also made foreign policy by deciding upon the leaders among the exiles who would make up the provisional government ready to take over when a foothold was secured. Its choices betrayed no notable concern about social reforms in the island. The spectacular misjudgments assured that changes would be made in a little empire that has spread into unexpected

fields since the cold war compelled the United States to accept peacetime espionage for the first time in its history.

Obviously, the White House recognizes that the activity must be continued. It knows for example, of the unpublicized successes the CIA has achieved since it was created in 1947, while public awareness of the agency is almost wholly limited to its most flamboyant failures. The years of U-2 surveillance of Russia went unknown until the unhappy 1960 loss of a flight that may possibly have been brought down by Russian fire. It is very nearly axiomatic that when the super-secret CIA is in the news, it is in trouble.

A further complaint the administration is weighing is that the CIA is somewhat less super-secret than should be the case with such an agency.

It can be argued that the CIA is less than the world's best intelligence service, but there is no debate that it is the most visible. Its director, Mr. Dulles, is a frequent—and engaging—public speaker in his capacity as chief of the American black chamber. Although the CIA has been hush-hush about its numerous addresses in Washington, centered in a cluster near the Lincoln Memorial, it is about to occupy an enormous \$50,000,000 palace across the Potomac that it is so conspicuous it lacks only listing on the rubberneck excursions with guided tours to watch the spies at work. This baffles its old-established counterparts, the British MI services and the French Deuxieme Bureau, accustomed to look upon their work as a sub rosa profession rather than as a national monument.

### Underground

The CIA needs to go underground.

The White House refused to make the CIA the goat for its chagrin over Cuba—there were other culprits—and is taking a calm approach to the revamping believed needed to increase its worth.

Nothing so far suggests that the administration sides with critics who complain that the guerrilla activities—to which the odd term, paramilitary, is applied—of the CIA are an improper function for an agency created to gather and collate intelligence. A consideration here is that such deeds can be disowned with greater verisimilitude when carried off by undercover operatives than if given over to the formal armed services.

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